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Dynamic pricing and wage-setting models have become central to macro-
economic modelling in the new neoclassical synthesis approach. It has be-
come apparent that di⁄erent models of pricing have di⁄erent implications for
matters such as the persistence of output and in￿ ation to monetary shocks.
Di⁄erent models of wage or price setting imply di⁄erent distributions of dura-
tions of price-spells (throughout this paper, we will use "price" as a shorthand
for "wage and price"). In this paper we focus on the class of time or du-
ration dependent models of pricing, such as Calvo and Taylor, rather than
state-dependent models (Dotsey et al 1999, John and Wolman 2008). We
formulate a uni￿ed framework for consistently understanding and comparing
these models.
We start from the idea of modelling the class of all steady state distri-
butions of durations across a given population (in this case, the ￿rms that
set prices). In steady state there are four equivalent ways of describing this.
First, there is the distribution of durations: this treats each price-spell as an
individual element in the population and ignores the fact that price-spells
are generated by ￿rms (and hence there maybe links between the individ-
ual price spells). Second, there is the cross-sectional distribution of ages: at
a point in time, how long it has been since the current price-spell began.
This is like the population census. Third, we can look at the distribution
in terms of hazard rates or survival probabilities: from the cross-section of
ages, the probability of progressing from one age to the next one. Lastly,
we can look at the cross-section of completed price-spells (lifetimes): this
corresponds to the average completed price-spell across ￿rms and hence in
this context we call it the Distribution across ￿rms (DAF). The main in-
novation of the paper is to develop a transparent framework that allows us
to move between these concepts. The ￿rst three concepts (distribution of
durations, cross-section of ages and hazard rates) are of course very well un-
derstood in statistics, being basic tools in demography, evolutionary biology
and elsewhere. The fourth concept, the cross-sectional distribution of com-
pleted durations is more novel. However, this concept is essential if we are to
answer questions such as what is the average price-spell across ￿rms and to
apply these concepts to understand and compare di⁄erent models of pricing.
Each of these ways of looking at the class of all steady-state distributions
has a natural application to modelling price and wage setting. In the Gen-
eralized Taylor Economy (GTE) (Taylor 1993, Carvalho 1995, Coenen et al
22007 Dixon and Kara 2010), there are many sectors with di⁄erent price-spell
lengths, and within each sector there is a simple Taylor process. The simple
Taylor economy where all contract lengths are the same is a special case of
the GTE. The GTE is linked to the microdata by looking at the cross-
sectional DAF : any cross-sectional can be represented by a unique GTE: In
the Calvo approach, we have a reset probability which may be constant (as
in the classical Calvo model) or duration dependent (Wolman 1999, Mash
2003 and 2004, Guerrieri 2006, Sheedy 2007, Paustian and von Hagen 2008).
We show that the Calvo model with duration-dependent reset probabilities
(denoted as the Generalized Calvo model GC) is linked to the microdata
through the hazard function: any hazard function can be represented by a
unique GC. Hence, both the GTE and GC are coextensive with the set
of all steady state distributions: each possible steady state distribution has
exactly one GC and one GTE which corresponds to it. Hence, using the
framework, we are able to compare the di⁄erent models of pricing for a given
distribution of durations of price spells. This enables us to isolate the precise
e⁄ect of the pricing model as opposed to the di⁄erences in the distribution
of durations. We also explore the Multiple Calvo (MC) economy: this is
a multi-sector model in which each sector has a sector-speci￿c calvo reset
probability (as in Carvalho 2006, Carvalho and Nechio 2008).
The framework in this paper also allows us to directly link microdata
to models of wage and price setting. We can take a given distribution of
price-spells and model it as either a GTE or a GC. We take UK CPI price
data for the period 1996-2006 described in Bunn and Ellis (2009, 2010a) and
estimate the hazard function from this data which we can use to calibrate
a our models of pricing: the resultant GTE and GC have exactly the same
distribution of price-spells as the UK data. Lastly, we take the sectoral
data in Bunn and Ellis (2010a) to model the UK as an 11-sector MC: We
are thus able to move directly from the microdata to the three models of
pricing: We are able to compare these three pricing models in a simple
model economy, enabling us to highlight the di⁄erences in the pricing model
controlling for the distribution of price-spells. What we ￿nd is that for this
distribution at least, the three pricing models are quite close in terms of the
impulse-response functions they generate in response to a monetary shock.
In particular, the GC and MC are quite similar. However, there can be
di⁄erences: with the UK data we ￿nd that the GTE has a hump shaped
impulse-response for in￿ ation, whilst the GC and MC do not. This re￿ ects
the fact that in a GTE the ￿rms know how long their price-spell is due to
3last and in this sense are more "myopic" in their pricing decisions.
In section 2 we review the facts about the steady state distribution of
durations, ages and hazard rates. We then introduce the new concept of the
cross-sectional distribution of durations across ￿rms and show how all four
concepts are related by simple formulae which are spreadsheet friendly. In
section 3, we de￿ne our models of pricing and show that the GC and GTE
are consistent with any distribution of price-spells. In section 4 we use the
UK data to illustrate our ideas and how the resultant pricing models perform
in a simply macroeconomy.
2 Steady State Distributions of Durations across
Firms.
We will consider the steady-state demographics of price-spells in terms of
their durations. The lifetime of a price-spell is how long it lasts from its
start to its ￿nish, a completed duration. There is a continuum agents f (we
will call them ￿rms here), which set prices (or wages), represented by the unit
interval f 2 [0;1]: Time is discrete and in￿nite t 2 Z+ = f0;1;2:::1g:A
price event (or price-quote) is a price set by a particular ￿rm at a particular
time: pft. A price spell is a duration, a sequence of consecutive periods
that have the same price. For every price event pair ft;fg we can assign
an integer d(t;f) which is the price spell duration of which the price event is
part of. Furthermore, we can de￿ne the subset of reset price events, when
￿rms set a new price:
R = f(t;f) : pft 6= pft￿1g ￿ [0;1] ￿ Z+ (1)
The distribution of durations is derived from the set R. Let the longest
duration1 be F < 1: Then we can de￿ne F subsets of R
R(i) = f(t;f) 2 R : d(t;f) = ig
Thus R(i) gives us the subset of durations of length i. The distribution of
durations is simply the proportions of all durations having length i = 1:::F :
￿
d =
￿
￿
d
i
￿F
i=1 2 ￿
F￿1
1The ￿niteness of F is merely for convenience and has no importance since it can be
set arbitrarily large.
4Where ￿F￿1 is the (F ￿ 1) dimensional unit simplex2. In steady-state this
simpli￿es, since the distribution of durations of new price-spells is the same
each period, we can take any "representative" t > F and de￿ne
￿
d
i = ￿
d
i(t) =
R 1
0 I((f;t) 2 R(i))df
R 1
0 I((f;t) 2 R)df
Where I is an index function that takes the value 1 if (at our chosen t) price
event (f;t) is in the relevant set, 0 otherwise. In steady-state the distribution
of durations is the same as the distribution of durations taken over the subset
of reset prices (new price spells).
2.1 Ages.
The age of a price-spell at time t is de￿ned as the period of time that has
elapsed since the price spell started. Formally, we can take a price event
pft and de￿ne the age as:
A(f;t) = 1 + min
s [t ￿ s]
s:t (f;s) 2 R
s ￿ t
Since we have integer time, we adopt the convention that the minimum age
is 1. Hence, for each (t;f) we have an associated measure of age a(f;t).
Let us de￿ne the subset of ￿rms at time t that are of age A = j.
j(t) = ff 2 [0;1] : A(f;t) = jg
Then the proportion of ￿rms aged j at t is for all t > F
￿
A
j = ￿
A
j (t) =
Z 1
0
I ((f;t) 2 j(t)):df
The steady-state distribution of ages is monotonic, since to become old
you must ￿rst be young. Hence the set of all possible steady state age
distributions is given by:
￿
F￿1
M =
￿
￿
A 2 ￿
F￿1 : ￿
A
j ￿ ￿
A
j+1
￿
where the subscript M refers to (weak) monotonicity.
2￿F￿1 =
￿
￿ 2 RF
+ : ￿ ￿ 0;
F P
i=1
￿i = 1
￿
52.2 Hazard Rate.
An alternative way of looking at the steady state distribution of durations
and the cross-section of ages is in terms of the hazard rate. The hazard
rate at a particular age is the proportion of spells at age i which do not last
any longer (spells which end at age i, people who die at age i). Hence the
hazard rate can be de￿ned in terms of the distribution of ages in steady-state
￿A 2 ￿
F￿1
M : the corresponding vector of hazard rates3 h2 [0;1)F￿1 (this is
called the hazard function or hazard pro￿le) is given by:
hi =
￿A
i ￿ ￿A
i+1
￿A
i
;i = 1:::(F ￿ 1) (2)
Corresponding to the idea of a hazard function is that of the survival proba-
bility4, the probability at birth that the price survives for at least i periods,
with S1 = 1 and for i > 1
Si = ￿
i￿1
￿=1(1 ￿ h￿) (3)
and we de￿ne the sum of survival probabilities ￿S and its reciprocal ￿ h :
￿S =
PF
i=1 Si ￿ h = ￿
￿1
S (4)
The survival function is the F￿1 vector of survival probabilities (S1;S2;:::SF):
Clearly, we can invert (2), hence relating the age distribution to the haz-
ard function:
Observation 1 given h2 [0;1)F￿1; there exists a unique corresponding age
pro￿le ￿A 2 ￿
F￿1
M given by:
3Since the maximum length is F; without loss of generality we set hF = 1. Hence the
hazard function is de￿ned by the (n ￿ 1) vector fhig
F￿1
i=1 with hi 2 [0;1):
4The Hazard rate can also be de￿ned in terms of the Survival function.
hi =
Si ￿ Si+1
Si
For the relationship between continouous and discrete time used here see Kiefer (1988)
and Fougere et al (2007). In continuous time,
h(t) =
S0(t)
S(t)
whilst in discrete time we take S0as ￿S = Si ￿Si+1: Note that whilst in continuous time
the hazard rate can be be larger than 1, the discrete time hi cannot be larger than 1.
6￿
A
i = ￿ hSi i = 1:::F.
Given the ￿ ow of new contracts ￿ h, the proportion surviving to age i
is Si : ￿ h = ￿
￿1
S ensures adding up. From the de￿nition of hazard rates
and Observation 1 we can move from an age distribution ￿s 2 ￿
F￿1
M to the
hazard pro￿le and vice versa.5
Observation 2 given h2 [0;1)F￿1; there exists a unique corresponding dis-
tribution of durations ￿d 2 ￿F￿1 given by:
￿
d
i = Sihi i = 1:::F.
The proportion of price-spells of duration i is the proportion surviving i
periods and no longer. Hence there is a unique 1 ￿ 1 relationship between
elements of the set of possible duration distributions and the set of possible
hazard pro￿les.
observation 3. For any ￿d 2 ￿
F￿1
M , the corresponding cross-section of ages
￿A 2 ￿
F￿1
M is given by
￿
A
i =
￿ h
hi
￿
d
i
and vice-versa.
2.3 The cross-sectional distribution of Completed Price-
spells across Firms.
The steady-state age distribution ￿A 2 ￿
F￿1
M , distribution of durations ￿d 2
￿F￿1 or hazard pro￿le h2 [0;1]
F￿1 are di⁄erent ways of looking at the same
object: a panel of price events. Each row of the panel is a trajectory of
prices corresponding to a particular ￿rm. Each column is a cross-section
of all of the prices set by ￿rms at a point in time. We now introduce a
fourth distribution: it is a cross-sectional distribution of completed durations
or lifetimes across ￿rms ￿ 2 ￿F￿1. In e⁄ect, we take a representative t, and
5 This relationship is one of the building blocks of Life Tables (Chiang 1984), which
are put to a variety of uses by demographers, actuaries and biologists. Dixon and Siciliani
(2009) apply the identity to hospital waiting lists in the UK to derive the hazards and
corresponding distribution of completed durations.
7for each ￿rm we see the completed price-spell duration at that time d(f;t):
If we de￿ne
R(i;t) = ff 2 [0;1] : d(t;f) = ig
then the proportion of ￿rms at time t with a completed duration of i;￿i is
de￿ned by:
￿i = ￿i (t) =
Z 1
0
I ((f;t) 2 R(i;t))df
Under the steady-state assumption ￿i is constant over time, and hence we
omit the time indicator.
We can move from the distribution of ages to the distribution of completed
contract lengths across ￿rms:
Proposition 1 Consider a steady-state age distribution ￿A 2 ￿
F￿1
M . There
exists a unique distribution of lifetimes across ￿rms ￿ 2 ￿F￿1 which corre-
sponds to ￿A, where
￿1 = ￿
A
1 ￿ ￿
A
2 (5)
￿i = i
￿
￿
A
i ￿ ￿
A
i+1
￿
::
￿F = F￿
A
F
All proofs are in the appendix. Since there is a 1-1 mapping from ages
to lifetimes, we can compute the distribution of lifetimes from ages:
Corollary 1 Given a distribution of steady-state completed lifetimes across
￿rms, ￿ 2 ￿F￿1, there exists a unique ￿A 2 ￿
F￿1
M corresponding to ￿
￿
A
j =
F X
i=j
￿i
i
j = 1:::F (6)
The intuition behind Proposition 1 and the Corollary is clear. In a
steady state, each period must look the same in terms of the distribution of
ages This implies that if we look at the i period price-spells, a proportion
of i￿1 must be renewed each period. Thus if we have 10 period contracts,
10% of these must come up for renewal each period. This implies that the
8proportion of contracts coming up for renewal each period (which have age
1) is:
￿
A
1 =
1 X
i=1
￿i
i
The proportion of contracts aged 2 is the set of contracts that were reset last
period (￿s
1), less the ones that only last one periods (￿1) and so on. The set
of all possible steady state distributions of durations can be characterized
either by the set of all possible age distributions: ￿A 2 ￿
F￿1
M or the set of
all possible lifetime distributions across ￿rms ￿ 2 ￿F￿1: They are just two
di⁄erent ways of looking at the same thing.
Proposition 1 and its corollary show that there is an exhaustive and 1-1
relationship between steady state age distributions and lifetime distributions.
Now, since we know that there is also a 1-1 relation between Hazard rates
and age distributions, we can also see that there will be a 1-1 relationship
between completed contract lifetimes and hazard rates. First, we can ask
what distribution of completed contract durations corresponds to a given
vector of hazard rates. We can simply take observation 1 to transform the
hazards into the age distribution, and then apply Proposition 1.
Corollary 2 let h2 [0;1)F￿1: The distribution of lifetimes across ￿rms cor-
responding to h is:
￿i = ￿ h:i:hi:Si: i = 1:::F (7)
The ￿ ow of new contracts is ￿s
1 = ￿ h each period. To survive for exactly
i periods, you have to survive to period i which happens with probability Si,
and then start a new contract which happens with probability hi. Hence from
a single cohort ￿ h:hi:Si will have contracts that last for exactly i periods. We
then sum over the i cohorts (to include all of the contracts which are in the
various stages moving towards the their ￿nal period i) to get the expression.
We can also consider the reverse question: for a given distribution of
completed contract lengths ￿;what is the corresponding pro￿le of hazard
rates? From Corollary 2, note that (7) is a recursive structure relating ￿i
and hi: ￿i only depends on the values of hs for s ￿ i.
Corollary 3 Consider a distribution of contract lengths across ￿rms given
by ￿ 2 ￿F￿1. The corresponding hazard pro￿le that will generate
9this distribution in steady state is given by h2 [0;1)F￿1 where:
hi =
￿i
i
 
F X
j=i
aj
j
!￿1
Corollary 4. For completeness, we can also ask for a given cross-section
DAF ￿ 2 ￿F￿1; what is the corresponding distribution of durations
￿d 2 ￿F￿1 is:
￿
d
i =
￿i
i:￿ h
(8)
This follows directly formthe comparison of (7) and observation 2. Clearly,
by de￿nition, the distribution of durations is the same as the distribution
across ￿rms resetting prices (new price-spells). The more frequent price
setters (shorter price-spells) have a higher representation relative to longer
price-spells. Note that the rhs denominator is the product of the contract
length and the proportion of ￿rms resetting price. For the values of i < ￿ h￿1,
the share of the duration i is greater across contracts than ￿rms: for larger
i > ￿ h￿1 the share across contracts is less than the share across ￿rms.
3 Pricing Models with steady state distribu-
tions of durations across ￿rms.
Having derived a uni￿ed framework for understanding the set of all possible
steady state distributions of durations across ￿rms, we can now see how
this can be used to understand commonly used models of pricing behavior.
Indeed, we can see how each pricing theory relates to the whole set of possible
steady-state distributions. There are now several studies using micro data: in
particular the In￿ation Persistence Network (IPN) across the Eurozone has
been particularly comprehensive6: Alvarez and Hernando (2006) for Spain,
Veronese et al (2005) for Italy, Baudry et al (2007) for France and Ho⁄man
and Kurz-Kim (2006) for Germany. For the US we have Klenow and Krystov
(2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and also Bunn and Ellis (2009, 2010)
for the UK. CPI microdata is in e⁄ect a (balanced) panel on the prices of
individual products sold at individual outlets. They have trajectories for
6See Dhyne et al (2006) for a summary of the IPN￿ s ￿ndings. Alvarez (2008) also
provides a useful summary.
10prices: sequences of price spells for a product at an individual outlet. We can
think of each trajectory as analogous to the sequence of price spells for an
individual ￿rm in the context of this paper. All of these studies cover the
period of the Great Moderation: there is low and stable in￿ ation for which
the assumption of steady-state is particularly appropriate: also, the studies
span several years so that the seasonal variation in the data is averaged out.
The key insight is that we can use any adequate description of the whole
distribution of price-spells. Under the assumption of steady-state we can
then derive the others as outlined in the previous section. The way the data
is usually described is the following:
1. The Hazard function. This is estimated in di⁄erent ways (see Appendix
1), but in principle we can relate the hazard pro￿le h2 [0;1)F￿1 to the
estimated hazard function. Most papers include the estimated hazard
function for the whole economy and at a more disaggregated level. This
can in principle be used to generate the corresponding distribution of
durations
￿
￿d
i
￿
and the related cross-sectional distribution f￿ig:
2. The frequencies of price change: ￿ h. The proportion of ￿rms changing
prices per month: this can be aggregated over time or across sectors.
Unfortunately, this statistic does not tell us the distribution of dura-
tions or the hazard pro￿le. We need to make additional assumptions
about the underlying distribution to unpack the distribution of dura-
tions from the frequency. In Dixon and Kara (2005,2010), we assume
that there is a Calvo distribution within each sector with the Calvo
reset probability being the proportion of ￿rms re-setting their price.
Applying this to the Bils and Klenow (2004) data appendix, we gener-
ate the corresponding cross-sectional distribution f￿ig:
In this section we state models of pricing that are su¢ ciently general to
re￿ ect the empirical micro-data on prices: these are essentially generalizations
of the standard Taylor and Calvo models.
3.1 The Generalized Taylor Economy GTE
Using the concept of the Generalized Taylor economy GTE developed in
Dixon and Kara (2005), any steady-state distribution of completed durations
across ￿rms ￿ 2 ￿F￿1can be represented by the GTE with the sector shares
given by ￿ 2 ￿F￿1 : GTE (￿). In each sector i there is an i￿period Taylor
11contract, with i cohorts of equal size: The sector share is given by ￿i: Since
the cohorts are of equal size and there as many cohorts as periods, there are
￿i:i￿1 contracts renewed each period in sector i. This is exactly as required
in a steady-state. Hence the set of all possible GTEs is equivalent to the
set of all possible steady-state distributions of durations. Note that for the
GTE we need to know the DAF ￿. Although we can derive the DAF from
the distribution of price-spells ￿d, the latter cannot be applied directly to
any price theory. In e⁄ect, since the distribution of durations ignores the
panel structure of the economy and the role of ￿rms in setting prices, it does
not directly relate to ￿rms pricing behavior.
In a GTE, the reset price at time t in sector i xit is (in log-linearised
form):
xit =
 
1
Pi￿1
k=0 ￿
k
!
i￿1 X
k=0
￿
kp
￿
t+k (9)
where p￿
t is the optimal ￿ ex-price at time t and ￿ the discount rate. There
are F reset price equations, with i = 1:::F. The F prices in each sector i
are simply the average over the i cohorts in that sector:
pit =
1
i
i￿1 X
k=0
xit￿k (10)
The aggregate price level is simply:
pt =
F X
i=1
￿ipit (11)
It is simple to verify that the age-distribution in a GTE is given by (6).
If we want to know how many contracts are at aged j periods, we look at
sectors with lifetimes at least as large as j, i = j:::F. In each sector i, there
is is a cohort of size ￿i:i￿1 which set its price j periods ago. We simply sum
over all sectors i ￿ j to get (6). The GTE has been employed by Taylor
(1993), Carvalho (1995), Coenen et al (2007), Dixon and Kara (2005, 2010),
Kara (2008, 2009)7.
Note that the GTE the "sectors" ￿i are de￿ned by the duration of the
price-spells, not the industry or CPI category. They are the proportion of all
7See also Whelan (2004) for a theoretcial analysis.
12￿rms (across all sectors) that have i period contracts. The key thing is that
when they set their price, the ￿rm knows how long it will last (i periods). In
fact, if we assume that all ￿rms know how long the price-spells are going to
last, individual ￿rms could move between "duration sectors": for example, a
￿rm might set a price for 3 months and be in the i = 3 sector, and then put
it on sale for one month and be in the i = 1 sector that month and so on.
3.2 The Generalized Calvo model (GC): duration de-
pendant reset probabilities.
The Calvo model most naturally relates to the hazard rate approach to view-
ing the steady state distribution of durations and it has a constant hazard
rate. We now consider generalizing the Calvo model to allow for the reset
probability (hazard) to vary with the age of the contract (duration depen-
dent hazard rate). This we will denote the Generalized Calvo Model GC. A
GC is de￿ned by a sequence of reset probabilities: as in the previous section
this can be represented by any h2 [0;1)F￿1 where F is the shortest contract
length with hF = 1. Thus the empirical hazard rates displayed in the data
can be used to calibrate the hazard pro￿le in the GC model. The resul-
tant model can be consistent with any steady-state distribution of durations,
including the one found in the data8.
The GC di⁄ers from the GTE in that when they reset prices, ￿rms do
not know how long the price-spell is going to last. There is not a sector
speci￿c reset price, but one economy wide reset price xt with xit = xt for all
i = 1:::F. The log-linearised formula for the optimal reset price at t is
xt =
1
PF
k=1 Sk￿
k￿1
F X
k=1
Sk￿
k￿1p
￿
t+k￿1 (12)
The aggregate price is then given by:
pt = ￿ h
F X
k=1
Skxt￿k (13)
The di⁄erence between the GTE and the GC lies in the whether the duration
of the price-spell is known: with the GC only the distribution of price spells
8Note that an alternative parameterization of the duration dependent hazard rate
model is to specify not the hazard rate at each duration, but rather the probability of
the completed contract length at birth (see for example Guerrieri 2006).
13is known by the ￿rm. In e⁄ect, the ￿rm does not know ex ante which sector
it is in, so that all reset-prices set at time t are the same. The GC model
has been employed by Wolman (1999), Mash (2003,2004), Dotsey and King
(2006), Guerrieri (2006), Sheedy (2007) and Paustian and von Hagen (2008).
3.3 The Multiple Calvo Model (MC).
One format that the micro-data is presented is in the form of the proportion of
￿rms changing prices each month, often with a detailed sectoral breakdown:
see Bils and Klenow (2004), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Klenow and
Krystov (2008), similar data in most of the IPN studies and the Bank of
England work on the UK (Bunn and Ellis (2010a,b). This naturally suggests
a modelling strategy of a multiple sector Calvo model MC. We can de￿ne
a multiple Calvo process MC as MC
￿
~ h;￿
￿
where ~ h2 (0;1)
n gives a sector
speci￿c hazard rate9 ~ hk for each sector k = 1;:::n and ￿ 2 ￿
n￿1 is the vector
of shares ￿k (this might be expenditure or CPI weights). The reset price
for each sector k = 1:::n is then:
xkt =
1
PF
j=1
￿
1 ￿ ~ hk
￿j￿1
￿
j￿1
F X
j=1
￿
1 ￿ ~ hk
￿j￿1
￿
j￿1p
￿
t+j￿1 (14)
The average price in each sector k is then
pkt =
F X
j=1
￿
1 ￿ ~ hk
￿j￿1
￿
j￿1xkt￿j+1 (15)
And the aggregate price is then
pt =
n X
k=1
￿kpkt (16)
The Multiple Calvo model has been employed by Carvalho (2006) and Car-
valho and Nechio (2008) and the earlier version of this paper (2006).
It is important to note that the MC will not generally have the same
hazard function as the data: it generates a smoothly declining hazard function
9The notation here should not be confused: the substrcripts k are sectoral: none of the
sectoral calvo reset probabiltities are duration dependent.
14which is di⁄erent to the jagged non-monotonic hazard functions often found
in the data. In that sense it is a parametric representation of the data and is
not an exact representation of the data as we have in the case of the hazard
or the three distributions: see Alvarez (2008).
3.4 The Typology of Contracts.
In terms of contract structure, we can say that the following relationships
hold:
￿ GC = GTE = SS. The set of all possible steady state distributions
of durations is equivalent to the set of all possible GTEs and the set
of all possible GCs.
￿ C ￿ MC ￿ GC. The set of distributions generated by the Simple
Calvo is a special case of the set generated by MC which is a special
case of GC.
￿ ST ￿ GTE = GC Simple Taylor is a special case of GTE, and hence
also of GC.
￿ ST \MC = ?. Simple Taylor contracts are a special case of GC, but
not of MC.
15Figure 1: The
Typology Of
Contracts.
This is depicted in Fig 1. The GC and the GTE are coextensive, being the
set of all possible steady-state distributions (Propositions 1 and corollary 3).
The Simple calvo C (one reset probability) is a strict subset of the Multiple
Calvo process MC which is a strict subset of the GC10. The simple Taylor
ST and the MC are disjoint. The ST is a strict subset of the GTE: The size
of the distributions is re￿ ected by the Figure: ST has elements corresponding
to the set of integers and is represented by a few dots; Calvo is represented
by the unit interval; MC by the unit interval squared.
The simple Calvo and Taylor models are only applicable if there is one
type of contract and no heterogeneity in the economy. If we believe the
Calvo model, but that reset probabilities are heterogenous across price or
wage setters, then the MC makes sense. If we do not believe the Calvo
model, then either the GC or GTE are appropriate.
10The MC can be represented by a GC with a decreasing Hazard. See an earlier version
of the paper with the same title, ECB working paper 676, Proposition 2 for a derivation
in discrete time.
164 An application to UK price data.
In this section, I illustrate the framework of steady-state identities to the UK
price data. As described in Bunn and Ellis (2009, 2010a), the ONS micro-
data for constructing the CPI is available for use at the VML laboratory:
it covers the years 1996-2006 and consists of 11 million price-observations
that were collected "locally" by ONS sta⁄, rather than centrally. We have
followed Bunn and Ellis￿ s methodology in analyzing the data, except for the
estimation of the hazard and survivor function (see Appendix 1).
Firstly, we start from the hazard function for the CPI covering all goods
and services in the VML dataset: we present the Hazard for the weighted
data (see Bunn and Ellis (2010a) for the weighting methodology) . The
weighted data puts more weight on services which have a lower hazard in the
￿rst few months. We set F = 44 months: there are very few spells lasting
more than 44 months (less than 0.01%)11. We depict the UK hazard rate for
the ￿rst 37 months.
Fig 2: The UK Hazard Rate.
The CPI hazard function is similar to those found in other countries12: it
110.086313% to be exact to 4 s.f.
12See Alvarez (2008) page 12 for examples from four EU countries.
17declines rapidly for the ￿rst six months: there is 12 month "spike" and after
that it remains roughly constant. Note that the Hazard rate is between
10%-15% from month 4 onwards (except for months 12 and 24 and towards
the end when very few spells survive). The implications of this are that
there is a signi￿cant long-tail of price-spells. We can see this if we look at
the survival function depicted in Figure 3: the probability of surviving up to
24 months is 2.4%; the probability of surviving up to 36 months is a little
under 0.5%. The implied monthly frequency of ￿rms re-setting their prices
￿
￿1
S = 18:7% which is very close to the direct measurement made in Bunn
and Ellis (2010a) of 19.2% in the weighted data13.
Fig 3: The UK survival function
The survival function implies that there is a very long tail in the distribution
of durations and even more so in the cross-sectional DAF. As we would
expect, there are a lot of short durations: 50% of price-spells last only one
or two months. There is a 12 month spike, but a long tail (over 2% of
price-spells last more than 24 months, 1% more than 30 months). The DAF
is much ￿ atter: the share of one and two month spells is only 12%, there is
a peak at 12 months and the tail is even longer and fatter: 13.4% last longer
13See Bunn and Ellis (2010a) Tables A3 and A4.
18than 24 months and 3% last longer than 36 months. The mean price-spell
duration is ￿ d = 5:3 months (median 2, mode 1): the cross-sectional mean
￿ T = 13:2 months (median 10 months, mode 1 month). The cross sectional
distribution is broadly consistent with the survey data (see Alvarez 2008,
page 11) where ￿rms are asked how often they change price.
Fig 4: The UK Distributions.
An alternative way of looking at the data is parameterizing it using the
Multiple Calvo MC approach. In this we take data on the sectoral frequen-
cies of price-adjustment and assume that within each sector there is a Calvo
distribution. We can then sum up across sectors to obtain the aggregate
distribution implied by this parameterization. By construction, this has the
same frequency of price-change as in the data: 19.2%. However, the Hazard
rate is a smoothly declining one and the distribution of durations and the
DAF di⁄er signi￿cantly from the one found in the data.
4.1 Pricing Models Compared with a UK calibration:
a simple example.
We will use the UK micro-data to see how the di⁄erent models of pricing
di⁄er in terms of their impulse-response using a very simple stripped-down
19log-linearised macro-model (see Ascari 2003, Dixon and Kara 2005 and 2010).
Whilst we have used an extremely simple macro-model for purposes of trans-
parency, the pricing equations can also be set in extended DGSE models
such as Smets and Wouters (2003) as is done with the French micro-data in
Dixon and LeBihan (2010): The advantage of our simple model is that most
of the dynamics originates from the pricing models, the only other source
being a simple auto-regressive money-supply shock. To model the demand
side, we use the Quantity Theory:
yt = mt ￿ pt
where (pt;yt) are aggregate price and output and mt the money supply. We
model the monetary process as AR(1) :
mt = mt￿1 + "t
"t = ￿"t￿1 + ￿t
where ￿t is a white noise error term. We consider the cases of ￿ = 0 and
￿ = 0:5 (the latter follows Christiano et al (2005)).
The optimal ￿ exible price p￿
t at period t in all sectors is given by:
p
￿
t = pt + ￿yt
The key parameter ￿ captures the sensitivity of the ￿ exible price to output14:
we calibrate ￿ = 0:1 as discussed in Dixon and Kara (2010). We have
converted the monthly price data into quarterly data.
Given this rudimentary macro-structure, we can then insert the sectoral
reset-price equations15, and sectoral price equations into the model, and ag-
gregate according to (11) or (16). We compare three models: the GTE, the
GC which both have exactly the same distribution of price-spell durations
as found in the UK data, and thirdly the sectoral MC model calibrated with
the COICOP weights and frequencies of price-adjustment16.
14This can be due to increasing marginal cost and/or an upward sloping supply curve
for labour. See for example Walsh (2003) chapter 5 and Woodford (2003) chapter 3.
15For the GTE we have (9;10); for the GC we have (12;13), for the MC we have
(14;15).
16See Bunn and Ellis (2010a) tables A3 and A4.
20In Figure 5, we depict the responses of output, the reset price17, the
general price level and in￿ ation to a one-o⁄ shock with ￿ = 0:2. Looking at
all the graphs, it is striking that the three models of pricing have fairly similar
impulse-responses. However, if we compare the GTE and GC (which have
exactly the same distribution of price-spells), we can see that in the GTE
the e⁄ect on output is consistently bigger than with the GCE and likewise
the e⁄ect on the price level is smaller. This can be explained by the more
myopic response of the reset-prices under GTE: as we can see from the mean
reset-price which react less on impact for the GTE. The greater myopia
of the GTE stems from the fact that if the ￿rm knows the length of its
price-spell when it sets its price, it will only take into account the ￿ ex-price
over the period of the spell: it can ignore what happens after that because it
knows it can re-set its price. In the GC however, the ￿rm will have to take
into account events until F periods hence. The resultant e⁄ect on in￿ ation
is much dampened for the GTE on impact relative to the GCE, the level
of in￿ ation being lower for the ￿rst 4 quarters. and higher subsequently. If
we turn to the MC, we can see that it is similar to the GC but the e⁄ect
on output is larger and on the reset price and price level more sluggish. In
terms of in￿ ation, this means that there is less in￿ ation initially (for the ￿rst
six months) and more later.
In Figure 6 we consider an autoregressive monetary policy shock and ￿nd
that there is now a more radical di⁄erence between the GTE and the other
two models. If we look at in￿ ation we see that there is a distinct hump shape
which is exclusive to the GTE: the peak impact on in￿ ation appears after the
initial monetary shock. Whilst all IRs have a hump in output, both the MC
and the GC have a maximum response of in￿ ation on impact. This re￿ ects
the ￿nding in Dixon and Kara (2010) that the Calvo model does not capture
the characteristic "hump shaped" response indicated by empirical VARS.
This "no hump" feature appears to be shared by its generalizations MC and
GC. If we turn to output, we can see that the e⁄ect of the monetary shock
on output (prices) is consistently greater (less) in the GTE than the GCE.
The MC has a more ambiguous relationship. If we compare the GTE and
MC, we can see that the average reset price and general price levels are
17The average reset price is the average conditional on the price being reset. For the
GTE this is:
￿ xt =
F X
i=1
￿￿i
i
￿
xit:
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 higher for the MC up to the 9th quarter, and then lower: this implies that
the output response is larger initially for the GTE, but less after the 10th
quarter.
This example of the IRFs of major variables in a simple macro-model
shows how di⁄erent models of pricing can yield di⁄erent patterns of behavior
even though the distributions of price-spells are exactly the same or similar.
This re￿ ects di⁄erences in the pricing behaviour of ￿rms under the di⁄erent
models. Using the UK data to calibrate the model, it seems to make a
substantial di⁄erence to output and in￿ ation responses depending on whether
￿rms know the duration of their price-spells ex ante (as in the GTE) or not
(as in the GC).
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a consistent and comprehensive framework
both for analyzing di⁄erent pricing models (excluding the state-dependent
pricing models) and relating the pricing models to the microeconomic data.
In particular, the distribution of completed price-spells across ￿rms (DAF)
is a key perspective which is fundamental to understanding and comparing
di⁄erent models. Any steady state distribution of durations can be looked
at in terms of completed durations, which suggests it can be modelled as
a GTE; it can also be thought of in terms of Hazard rates which suggests
the GC approach. Both the GC and the GTE are comprehensive: they
can represent all possible steady states. We also relate this approach to
sectoral frequency data which is widely available and can be modelled as a
MC. When we apply this framework to the UK micro-data, we ￿nd that the
di⁄erent pricing models imply di⁄erent macroeconomic behaviour in terms
of the impulse response functions to a monetary shock.
As more empirical micro-data becomes available, it is vital that we adopt
a framework which enables us to link the data to our macroeconomic models.
Whilst the approach adopted here is limited to steady-state analysis, it does
provide a consistent way for linking the micro-data to the macroeconomic
models of pricing. It is for future work to see how this analysis can be
applied to non-steady-state analysis and state-dependent models.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Estimating the survival function.
This section describes how the survival function and related hazard function
in discrete time can be estimated using pricing microdata in a way that is
consistent and applicable models of pricing. Currently, the methods available
in the statistical packages such as SAS and STATA have been designed with
other applications in mind (medical data etc) and do not give the most
relevant output at ￿rst pass. They are based on the Kaplin-Meier (KM)
nonparametric estimator Fortunately, it is simple to adjust the output to
give the survivor and hazard functions in a manner which is consistent with
the framework of this paper.
The ￿rst adjustment to the survival function required arises from the
fact that we are looking at pricing models in discrete time macroeconomic
framework. In these theories, the ￿rm believes that it has a probability of
1 that it its price lasts for at least one period. The way survival rates are
usually reported is that the failure occurs during the period: thus the period
one survival rate is one minus the period one hazard rate. This is easily
adjusted: following the pricing theory, we simply set S(1) = 1 and then "lag"
the estimated survival rates by one period to get (3). In e⁄ect, we are
assuming that all of the failures in period 1 occur at the end of the period.
We can see this as simply alternative ways of de￿ning the survival rate: in
standard survival analysis, S(i) is the "probability of surviving to the end of
period i", in this paper we de￿ne the rate as the "probability of surviving to
the beginning of period i".
The second issue is more complex and has to do with how we reconcile the
estimated hazard function with the data on the proportion of ￿rms changing
price per month, which is 19.2% for the weighted data. From the theoretical
framework of this paper, we know from (4) that the sum of the survival
rates should be equal to the proportion of ￿rms changing price each month:
￿ h = ￿
￿1
S . In order to explore this issue, we need to look more closely at
how the KM estimator is implemented in packages such as SAS and STATA.
First, we de￿ne the set of price-spells which we want to include (and hence
27which to exclude, such as left-censored spells). We also de￿ne an event
("failure") which in this case is a price-change. The package then looks at
all the price-spells in the panel (in our paper de￿ned by the set R de￿ned
by equation (1)). It then prints out the raw data in a column: this lists the
number of price-spells that lasted up to i periods i = 1:::F: The ￿rst row is
the total of all price-spells. The second row is those that lasted two or more
periods etc. Next to this column are two others: "failed" and "lost". Of
those spells that did not last more than one period, some ended because of
a price-change (which we de￿ne as "failure"), and some for another reason
(right truncation/censoring or some other reason). If we de￿ne the number
of number of price-spells that have lasted up to the ith period ni, these are
de￿ned as the spells "at risk" of failure. Of these, fi fail, Li are lost and the
rest survive to the next period: ni+1 = ni￿fi￿Li. The basic KM estimator
for the survival probability up to period i is:
^ S
1(i) =
Qi
j=1
￿
1 ￿
fi
ni
￿
(17)
A key assumption of the KM estimator is that failure and loss are mutually
exclusive: that is if a spell is "lost", then it would not have failed (Kaplin and
Meier (1958) page 461 describe this as "the convention that death preceeds
loss").
KM recognised that this assumption would not be reasonable in many cir-
cumstances: they also considered the "adjusted-observed" estimator, which
is
^ S
2(i) =
Qi
j=1
 
1 ￿
fi
ni ￿
Li
2
!
(18)
This estimation method is also found in packages such as SAS and STATA.
Many exisiting studies of the micro-price data appear to use either the "death
preceeds loss" or the adjusted-observed estimation method: for example Bunn
and Ellis (2010a,b) for the UK data, Baudry et al (2007) for the French data.
There is a basic problem with these two estimators when applied to the
CPI data: the survival rates are too high. For example, with the UK data
set, the implied average monthly frequency of price change (the reciprocal
of the sum of survival probabilities ￿
￿1
S ) is 11%, which is much smaller than
what is observed in the data (19.2%). In this paper, to remedy this problem,
we have made the assumption that all of the lost spells represent failures
28("loss is failure"), so that we have:
^ S
3(i) =
Qi
j=1
￿
1 ￿
fi + Li
ni
￿
(19)
This estimator implies a monthly frequency of price change of 18.7% which
is much closer to the data. Whilst our preferred KM estimator of the hazard
function delivers a result that is closer to the data on monthly frequency of
price change, it is an ad hoc improvement to the more common methodology
and further research on this issue is required to develop a fully appropriate
and "optimal" estimator in this context.
7.2 Proofs.
7.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1 and Corollaries 1 and 3.
Proof. The proportion of ￿rms that have a contract that last for exactly
1 period are those that are born (age 1) and do not go on to age 2. The
proportion of ￿rms that last for exactly i periods in any one cohort (born
at the same time) is given by those who attain the age i but who do not
make it to i+1 : this is
￿
￿A
i ￿ ￿A
i+1
￿
per cohort and at any time t there are
i cohorts containing contracts that will last for i periods.
Clearly, since ￿A
j are monotonic, ￿i ￿ 1, and
F X
i=1
￿i =
F X
i=1
i
￿
￿
A
i ￿ ￿
A
i+1
￿
=
￿
￿
A
1 ￿ ￿
A
2
￿
+ 2
￿
￿
A
2 ￿ ￿
A
3
￿
￿ 3
￿
￿
A
3 ￿ ￿
A
4
￿
::::
=
F X
i=1
￿
A
i = 1
Hence ￿ 2 ￿F￿1:
The relationship between the distribution of ages and lifetimes can be
depicted in terms of matrix Algebra: in the case of F = 4:
2
6 6
4
￿1
￿2
￿3
￿4
3
7 7
5 =
2
6 6
4
1 ￿1 0 0
0 2 ￿2 0
0 0 3 ￿3
0 0 0 4
3
7 7
5
2
6 6
4
￿A
1
￿A
2
￿A
3
￿A
4
3
7 7
5
29Clearly, the 4￿4 matrix is a mapping from ￿3 ! ￿3: since the matrix is of
full rank, the mapping from ￿A to ￿ is 1 ￿ 1. Clearly, this holds for any F.
7.2.2 Proof of Corollary 1:
Proof. To see this, we can rewrite (5):
￿1 = ￿
A
1 ￿ ￿
A
2
￿2
2
=
￿
￿
A
2 ￿ ￿
A
3
￿
￿i
i
=
￿
￿
A
i ￿ ￿
A
i+1
￿
￿F
F
= ￿
A
F
hence summing over all possible durations i = 1:::F gives
F X
i=1
￿i
i
=
F￿1 X
i=1
￿
￿
A
i ￿ ￿
A
i+1
￿
+ ￿
A
F = ￿
A
1
So that by repeated substitution we get:
￿
A
2 = ￿
A
1 ￿ ￿1 =
F X
i=2
￿i
i
￿
A
j =
F X
i=j
￿i
i
j = 1:::F
7.2.3 Corollary 3.
Proof. Rearranging the F ￿ 1 equations (7) we have:
￿1
￿ h
= h1;
￿2
2￿ h
= h2 (1 ￿ h1):::
￿i
i:￿ h
= hiSi;:::
￿F
F￿ h
= SF
By repeated substitution starting from i = 1 we ￿nd that
hi =
￿i
i
 
￿ h ￿
i￿1 X
j=1
￿j
j
!￿1
(20)
30Si =
1
￿ h
"
￿ h ￿
i￿1 X
j=1
￿j
j
#
Since we know that hF = 1, from (20)this means that:
1 =
￿F
F
 
￿ h ￿
F￿1 X
i=1
￿i
i
!￿1
) ￿ h =
F X
i=1
￿i
i
Substituting the value of ￿ h into (20) establishes the result.
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